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RÉSUMÉ
En rapportant sa satisfaction vis-à-vis son travail ou toute autre expérience,
un individu ne communique pas le nombre d’unités d’utilité qu’il ressent. Plutôt,
conditionnellement à ses expériences antérieures, il exprime a posteriori sa
préférence relativement à d’autres emplois ou situations alternatives. Cette
nouvelle interprétation de la satisfaction révélée rend à la théorie microéconomique
son pouvoir explicatif tout en reconnaissant le rôle essentiel joué par la différence
entre la situation d’une personne et les opportunités. Les différences a posteriori
dans la richesse humaine sont les meilleurs prédicteurs de la satisfaction révélée.
Les modèles statiques de l’utilité relative et ceux d’utilité subjective sont tous
rejetés par les données, de même que le modèle économique où la satisfaction
de l’emploi est une mesure de la richesse humaine a posteriori. Le modèle de
choix a posteriori explique pourquoi, dans les enquêtes, une grande majorité de
personnes expriment leur bonheur ou leur satisfaction, pourquoi les jeunes et les
vieux ne réagissent pas aux différentielles de revenus courants et pourquoi le
passé joue davantage que la situation présente ou future.
Mots clés : satisfaction à l’emploi, modèles d’utilité relative, modèle de choix a
posteriori
ABSTRACT
By reporting his satisfaction with his job or any other experience, an
individual does not communicate the number of utils that he feels. Instead, he
expresses his posterior preference over available alternatives conditional on
acquired knowledge of the past. This new interpretation of reported job
satisfaction restores the power of microeconomic theory without denying the
essential role of discrepancies between one’s situation and available opportunities.
Posterior human wealth discrepancies are found to be the best predictor of
reported job satisfaction. Static models of relative utility and other subjective
well-being assumptions are all unambiguously rejected by the data, as well as an
"economic" model in which job satisfaction is a measure of posterior human
wealth. The "posterior choice" model readily explains why so many people usually
report themselves as happy or satisfied, why both younger and older age groups
are insensitive to current earning discrepancies, and why the past weighs more
heavily than the present and the future.
Key words : job satisfaction, relative utility models, posterior choice model
1. Introduction
People often express judgments of satisfaction or dissatisfaction towards their own
past experience of a brand, a ¯lm, their job, the incumbent government, and even
their whole life. What do these judgments mean and how can we make sense
of them for predicting important economic behavior like sales of a new brand,
strikes, quits, school enrollments, electoral outcomes, and even suicides?
Since opinions are often much easier to collect than objective data, the
popularity of opinion surveys among marketing services, psychologists, political
scientists and sociologists is hardly surprising. But a majority of economists
are still reluctant to use this abundant data, with a few notable exceptions
(Hamermesh 1977, Freeman 1978, Borjas 1979, and quite recently, Clark and
Oswald 1994, 1996). They view personal judgments of satisfaction and other
subjective opinions as a black box that should be opened only by psychologists
and sociologists. But, on the other hand, they are not happy with the stories told
by the latter as they contradict the accepted, and otherwise successful, theory of
utility.
What do psychologists, sociologists and a few daring economists have to say
about self reported job satisfaction? First of all, they interpret this judgment as
a direct measure of the utility or well-being felt by the respondent. Should this
measure be ordinal or cardinal is an unsettled question, but whatever position
is taken on this issue, the sensitive problem of interpersonal utility comparisons
has to be tackled. Once we make these steps, we have no other choice than
accepting the discomforting story that money alone does not buy satisfaction.
More than twenty years ago, Duncan (1975) and Easterlin (1973, 1975) have
provided descriptive statistics showing that, under the above interpretation,
raising the incomes of all does not increase the happiness of all. This ¯nding
has been replicated on many occasions. For example, Scitovsky (1992) reports for
the U.S. that over a period of 25 years where per capita income rose by 62%, \the
proportion of people who consider themselves very happy, fairly happy and not
too happy has hardly changed at all". These studies have also suggested that the
individual's ranking in the income distribution of an economy, or relative income,
has a signi¯cant impact on the level of well-being. Easterlin (1995) provides
a synthesis of recent evidence. Partly as a result of the poor predictability of
economic factors, researchers have turned to psychological theories of \subjective
well-being" (SWB), that adopt \non economic" utility functions in which enters
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some sort of discrepancy between objective conditions of life (e.g., income,
consumption) and a subjectively de¯ned reference. Under various assumptions
about the reference, SWB theories are consistent with the Duncan-Easterlin
observations while the conventional economic view is not.
Our ¯rst objective in this paper is to reconsider the competing, economic and
non economic, interpretations of reported (job) satisfaction as felt utility. We
extend previous work by specifying lifetime utility, and a semi-°exible functional
form which nests a variety of (broadly de¯ned) SWB hypotheses: relative utility
(among others, Van Praag 1968, Van de Stadt et alii 1985, Hamermesh 1977),
social comparison (e.g., Veblen 1899, Duesenberry 1962, Clark and Oswald 1996),
cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger 1957, Gilad et alii 1987), disappointment
(e.g., Loomes and Sugden 1986), and loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1991).
The main result of our econometric tests on Canadian cross-sectional data is that
the parsimonious assumption of relative utility should be accepted, and both the
economic model and other SWB hypotheses rejected.
Our second objective is to specify an econometric model that beats the
benchmark of relative utility, and to restore the power of microeconomic theory, by
taking a life cycle's view of job's choice and by giving a new ordinal interpretation
of happiness and satisfaction judgments. We achieve these two tasks in the
paper. Speci¯cally, we argue that the job satisfaction reported in questionnaires
is always conditional on the individual's having previously chosen and experienced
that job. It is the mere judgment that the respondent would now repeat his past
choice if he had to choose again. We view reported job satisfaction not as a
measure of felt utility, but as a potential choice conditional on past experiences
which may be simply called a posterior choice of own job. The latter choice
is conditional on available information at the time of the survey including the
\surprises" which occurred since the time of the choice. Moreover, we maintain
that communication in the form of reporting satisfaction or dissatisfaction in
a questionnaire is fundamentally an act, which reveals an ordinal preference
exactly like the purchase of an item would. The reason is that, if you wish
to make yourself understood by other persons with whom you communicate
but who cannot feel physically what you feel, you must convey messages that
have an ordinal value because only the latter will mean the same to all. The
life cycle model which we derive from this new interpretation in the paper is
consistent with the earlier ¯ndings of Duncan and Easterlin but also makes
new stark predictions, con¯rmed by the data. It readily explains why so many
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persons usually report themselves as happy or satis¯ed, why they are typically
more satis¯ed with their job than with their pay or with the government; why
the frequency of those reporting job satisfaction increases (is U -shaped) with
age; why job satisfaction negatively correlates with voluntary quits and union
a±liation; why current earnings discrepancies have hardly any in°uence on job
satisfaction in both the younger and the older age-groups; and why past earnings
discrepancies weigh more heavily than current ones on job satisfaction. The
posterior choice model also demonstrates that reported job satisfaction has two
components, one of which is backward-looking and known with certainty, and the
other is forward-looking and based on a personal expectation. Obviously, the
weights of these two components change drastically over the life cycle and this
has interesting implications. Finally, in avoiding the need to assume equivalence
of scales of reported satisfaction or happiness across individuals, we widen the
range of qualitative data that are amenable to economic analysis in such ¯elds
as job mobility, job matching, individual responses to changing incentives and
nonpecuniary rewards and other sorts of human behavior (for other applications
to consumer choice, fairness and paradoxes to the theory of riskless choice, see
L¶evy-Garboua and Montmarquette 1996a, 1996b).
Section 2 introduces the theory of job satisfaction as felt utility with a lifetime
extension of the neoclassical utility model and a discussion of the subjective
well-being models. Section 3 develops the theory of reported job satisfaction as
a posterior choice. Section 4 introduces the data and earnings functions that we
use later to estimate reference earnings, earnings discrepancies, and past earnings
from cross-sectional data. Section 5 describes the econometric speci¯cations of the
models and some related estimation problems. Section 6 presents the estimates
of reported job satisfaction consistent with seven SWB assumptions, posterior
choice, and lifetime utility. Section 7 concludes.
2. Job satisfaction as felt utility: Theory
2.1. The Lifetime Utility Model
The standard microeconomic theory considers that individuals have a de¯nite
lifetime indirect utility function:
U = U (H;u) , (1)
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where U stands for lifetime utility, H for (human) wealth, and u is a vector of
non-pecuniary amenities, hours of work (e®ort) and utilities from other spheres
of life.1
The interesting feature about studying job satisfaction rather than, say,
happiness about life is that (human) wealth acts in (1) as a potentially measurable
subutility of an objective nature. This o®ers a unique opportunity for testing
alternative theories of utility in a direct fashion as will be done here. What
has been estimated in the literature, however, is not equation (1) but a static
approximation of it, like U = U (y; u), in which y designates current earnings
(net of education and training costs). This static utility model is admittedly very
coarse but it is easily estimated on cross-section data.
The question arises whether the felt utility reported by an individual of given
age is forward-looking, which is the way economists tend to think about it (e.g.,
Hamermesh 1977). In such case, we should write human wealth after age a as the
present value of expected future earnings, EaVa ´ ya+1+
ya+2
1+r
+ ::: ; where r is the
interest rate per period. We would need an explicit model of earnings expectations
as a function of past magnitudes2. However, it is perhaps more intuitive to think
of someone expressing what he felt in the past as much as what he expects in the
future. This would become more obvious if subjects were asked to report their
satisfaction with the last play they saw (e.g., L¶evy-Garboua and Montmarquette
1996b) because it would now be understood that they have no intention of
attending the same show once again even if they liked it. Consequently, it may be
preferable to use for an individual at age a the following expression of his lifetime
human wealth :
Ha ´
aX
t=1
yt
(1 + r)t¡1
+
EaVa
(1 + r)a
(2)
The ¯rst term is the discounted sum of all past and current earnings. It has
the crucial property of being known with certainty by respondents and, thus, does
not rest on the latter's idiosyncratic way of forming expectations. Equation (2)
describes job satisfaction as the sum of this backward-looking component3 and
1Prices of goods and interest rates, which have no variability on cross-sectional data, are not
reported in equation (1).
2This approach was adopted in an earlier version of the paper (L¶evy-Garboua and
Montmarquette 1994).
3"Backward-looking" is a convenient but partly inappropriate expression. In equation (2),
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the more conventional forward-looking component. The weight of these two parts
varies systematically over the life-cycle : the forward looking part dominates for
the younger group, and the backward looking part dominates for the older group.
According to equation (2), the regression coe±cient of current earnings should
decrease with experience; this prediction is not supported by the forward-looking
utility model. This o®ers a very convenient way to test which of these two
interpretations is to be preferred as will be done is section 6. Things are slightly
more complicated, though, because the unobservable expected future earnings will
be correlated with current earnings. Training and deferred payment schemes will
create a downward bias on the coe±cient of current earnings in the earlier career
because current earnings will then be negatively correlated with future earnings.
Therefore, it seems wise for testing the theory to distinguish at least three periods
of life : (i) early career; (ii) mid-career; (iii) late career. The relation of current
earnings with job satisfaction is expected to be inversely U -shaped across age
groups.
The lifetime utility model (in anyone of its two versions) highlights the basic
inability of the standard economic approach to explain the following stylized facts :
1. uniform economic growth does not increase reported happiness and job
satisfaction (among others, Easterlin (1973, 1975, 1995) and Duncan (1975));
2. the frequency of reported job satisfaction typically increases with age (this
point will be con¯rmed by table 4);
3. according to a few studies (e.g., Clark 1993, Clark and Oswald 1996), women
and lower-educated workers seem to be more satis¯ed with their job although they
receive lower wages on average.
All of these facts (the third set should be taken with more caution than the
¯rst two) are plainly contradicted by the lifetime utility model4, although the two
last refutations were concealed in previous discussions by the widespread use of
the theoretically unattractive static form of the utility model.
it describes a posterior forward-looking view of the known past and present, an interpretation
that truly anticipates our discussion of section 3. At this stage of the analysis, it could still be
argued alternatively that the past and the future should both be discounted from the present
period. Such ambiguity is one of the conceptual di±culties raised by the treatment of reported
satisfaction as a direct measure of felt utility. Whatever interpretation is chosen will be tested
in section 6.3 but the latter will, in fact, be more badly rejected than the former.
4Uniform economic growth will raise current and future earnings in equation (2). Under
steady growth, job satisfaction should also be the greatest for younger generations. Finally,
permanently higher wages should produce greater job satisfaction.
5
2.2. Subjective well-being models
The basic refutation of the static and lifetime utility models has led many social
scientists to rely on alternative theories, further designated as SWB models. The
latter form a rather heterogeneous family, but they can all be summarized by a
modi¯ed utility function :
U = U(H;H¤; u) (3)
Equation (3), which substitutes for (1), incorporates an additional argument
H¤ that symbolizes some reference (human) wealth. The word \reference" wealth
and earnings has received in the literature at least three di®erent meanings.
Hamermesh (1977) considers market opportunities to be the natural economic
reference and describes it by the individual's reservation (next best) human
wealth. Theories of interdependent preferences, pioneered by Veblen (1899) and
Duesenberry (1949), emphasize the comparison of one's wealth to that of other
similar persons. An ordinalist version of the theory has been recently applied
to job satisfaction by Clark and Oswald (1996), and a cardinalist version of
relative utility was suggested a long time ago by Van Praag (1968) and his Dutch
colleagues (a recent evidence is Van de Stadt, Kapteyn and Van de Geer 1985), to
construct subjective poverty scales. The theory of interdependent preferences may
be held either in a weak form or in a strong form. The proposition that favorable
and unfavorable comparisons, symmetrically, have an impact on satisfaction and
dissatisfaction judgments, tested by Clark and Oswald (1996), is the weak form.
The assessment that only unfavorable comparisons or envious feelings matter
determines the strong form (Brenner (1983))5. Lastly, social researchers have
pointed out that, in a dynamic setting, the most natural reference for an individual
is perhaps his own prior expectation of wealth. Cohen and Axelrod (1984) argue
5Duesenberry (1962:32) clearly favored the strong form but eventually shifted to the weak
form in the formal statement of his theory: \The analysis of the forces causing impulses to
consume shows that these arise when an individual makes an unfavorable comparison of his
living standard with that of someone else. If these impulses must be rejected, the individual
is dissatis¯ed with his position. [...]. Consequently, the dissatisfaction with his consumption
standard which an individual must undergo is a function of the ratio of his expenditures to those
of people with whom he associates.
Thus if Ci is the consumption expenditure of one individual and Ui is his utility index, we
may write Ui = Ui (Ci=
P
®ijCj) where Cj is the consumption of the j
th individual and ®ij
is the weight applied by the ith consumer to the expenditure of the jth". The strong form of
Duesenberry's theory is obtained by assuming that ®ij = 0 whenever Cj · Ci.
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that individuals adapt their preferences after observing pleasant and unpleasant
surprises, i.e. discrepancies between expected utility and experienced utility.
Loomes and Sugden (1986) contend that the feelings of disappointment and elation
arouse respectively when expectations have not been met or have been superseded.
Gilad, Kaish and Loeb (1987) set the general form of utility functions consistent
with the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance. According to the latter,
initiated by Festinger (1957), people choose to believe that they are satis¯ed in
spite of a bad experience by ignoring the dissonant information. It takes a \very"
bad surprise to adjust to reality. Finally, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) have
explained many anomalies of riskless choice by their theory of loss aversion, where
utility is concave for gains and convex for losses, both measured from a reference
point which would often be one's initial position.
In most cases, the SWB models have not been presented in a readily testable
form. It is such a test that we wish to pursue here. We follow common practice by
restricting our investigation to a static utility, and postpone the test of the lifetime
utility model until section 6. Our empirical strategy is to estimate reported job
satisfaction by a semi-°exible functional form whose arguments are a value y¤
i
of current reference earnings of individual i (age a is omitted), an appropriate
function of earnings discrepancy "i ´ yi ¡ y
¤
i
and control utility shifters. The
chosen functional form should also nest the standard quasi-linear static utility :
Ui = ®i + ° yi, (4)
where ° is a positive constant, and ®i = ® + Zi ¯ is a linear equation
of psycho-sociological factors including education, gender, the felt disutility of
work, dissatisfaction with marriage, dissatisfaction with health and a number of
individual taste-shifters. Aside from its simplicity, a quasi-linear utility ensures
that the unobserved value of job amenities and unearned income enters into ®i or
an additive error component. Since an equivalent of (4) is :
Ui = ®i + ° y
¤
i
+ ° "i; the simplest modi¯ed utility which nests the standard
utility is :
Ui = ®i + °1y
¤
i
+ °2"i, (5)
where °1 and °2 are allowed to be unequal. Equation (5) is a linear form of the
social comparison model when 0 · °1 < °2, which boils down to the pure relative
utility model when °1 = 0: However, many of the mentioned SWB models include
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non-linear e®ects of earnings discrepancies. The following piece-wise linear form
is a fairly °exible way of introducing nonlinearities while nesting equations (4)
and (5) :
Ui = ®i + °1y
¤
i
+ °2"i + °3D"i + °4D+"i + °5D¡"i: (6)
D is a dummy variable equal to 1 when ¡µ¾" · "i < 0; that is when the
di®erence between realized and reference wage is negative and smaller or equal
(in absolute terms) than a value assumed here proportional to the standard error
of the earnings discrepancies; D is equal to 0 otherwise. Similarly, D+ is equal to
1 when "i > Á¾" and 0 otherwise, and D¡ is equal to 1 when "i < ¡µ¾" and 0
otherwise. µ and Á are both positive but need not be equal. ®i captures the direct
e®ect of personal characteristics and other components of utility on self-reported
job satisfaction.
Figure 1 helps to visualize the speci¯c functional forms of job satisfaction with
respect to earnings discrepancies embedded in equation (6), holding reference
earnings and other variables constant.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
3. Reported satisfaction as a posterior choice
Let us remark that you never ask someone whether he or she is satis¯ed with
something that he or she has not gotten or experienced before. So, the satisfaction
or dissatisfaction that someone reports, say, regarding his job must be conditional
on this person having chosen his job in the past and had experience of it. At the
moment an individual made his or her particular choice, the choice itself could
be seen as an expression of satisfaction; some time later, when asked to express a
judgment, this judgment of satisfaction should then be interpreted as a potential
act of choice conditional on past experiences. So to speak, the prior choice of a
job manifests an expected satisfaction, while reporting satisfaction of one's job
reveals a kind of posterior choice. Surprisingly, these points have gone unnoticed
in previous studies of (job) satisfaction. Moreover, remember that we always
measure satisfaction as reported by respondents in questionnaires. Their answer
must have an ordinal value because an outside observer (say the econometrician)
would simply not understand a cardinal response expressed in a subjective scale,
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and the purpose of communication from one subject to another is obviously to
make oneself understood.
We now examine the implications of this new interpretation of reported job
satisfaction. An individual making the posterior choice of his own job would be in
the peculiar position of knowing what happened until the present date. He would
report satisfaction, i.e. con¯rm his own past choices, if and only if, his (partly
known) expected human wealth was greater than his (partly known) alternatives.
Let Ja be an ordinal index of job satisfaction at age a. We de¯ne
8><
>:
Ja = 1 if Ha + u > H
¤
a
+ u¤
Ja = 0 if Ha + u · H
¤
a
+ u¤;
(7)
where (u¤)u designates the (reservation) value of non pecuniary determinants of
utility. The analysis is easily extended when more than two answers are allowed (as
was the case in the survey we used), by considering several alternative answers in
decreasing order of value. Assuming a binary answer without loss of generality, we
report (2) into (7) and write the following condition for reporting job satisfaction:
Ja = 1 i®
aX
t=1
y
t
¡ y¤
t
(1 + r)t ¡1
+
EaVa ¡ EaV
¤
a
(1 + r)a
+ u¡ u¤ > 0: (8)
Since the past is known with certainty, the individual's risk attitude does not
a®ect the backward looking part of this expression. Thus, the posterior choice
model predicts that reported satisfaction solely depends on discrepancies without
being in contradiction with accepted economic theory.
The theory also predicts two of the three stylized facts spelled out in section
2. Uniform economic growth will not make anyone happier because it will raise
all opportunities in equal proportions. The frequency of reported job satisfaction
typically increases with age because rational individuals always choose the best
job and, under rational expectations, they cannot be systematically wrong in
the long run. The backward-looking component of expression (8) is thus likely
to be permanently positive after reaching a su±cient number of years, while
the forward-looking component converges towards zero. The upward-sloping
relationship of job satisfaction with age is not necessarily monotonic, though, and
it may be U-shaped. Contrary to Hamermesh (1977), this result does not require
any job speci¯city of human investments. On the other hand, the model does
not predict any systematic e®ect of sex or education on job satisfaction, ceteris
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paribus. Being a man or a university graduate will tend to increase earnings
permanently in all occupations, and this will not a®ect the sign of (8) unless it
has a di®erential e®ect on the non-pecuniary value of jobs.
But the posterior choice model has even more to say. A stylized fact of previous
studies of satisfaction judgments (including ours) is that responses are typically
concentrated in the upper segments of the satisfaction scale (e.g., Campbell 1981,
Krahn and Lowe 1988). Most people usually report that they are happy or
pretty happy! This well-known fact has often been overlooked on the ground that
the satisfaction index is an arbitrary measure of SWB. Although this argument
may not be quite convincing (why should researchers bother about satisfaction
judgments if they are noise), it can no longer be addressed to us if we interpret
reported satisfaction as a meaningful choice. Indeed, the rationality assumption
implies that, under certainty, individuals always be satis¯ed with choices which
they deliberately made. A corollary is that respondents would be less satis¯ed on
average with experiences out of their control. A good instance is o®ered by the
surveys on the political popularity of governments in democratic regimes. As a
little half of respondents did not support the incumbent government in the polls,
it is not surprising that so little consensus is usually found in these judgments.
Other convincing evidence is the fact that respondents report greater overall job
satisfaction than pay satisfaction. The mean scores (standard deviations) found
by Clark and Oswald (1996, data appendix) on a 1-7 scale were respectively 5.50
(1.51) and 4.49 (1.95). A suggested interpretation is that individuals control their
job as a whole better than their pay, because choosing a job is a package deal
whose single elements, like pay, cannot be freely and separately chosen.
Lastly, it should be noted that the \posterior choice" underlies no real decision,
but it does point to some real decision. Omitting the non pecuniary value of
jobs for simplicity, equations (7) and (8) indicate that reported job satisfaction
means: Ha ¡ H
¤
a
> 0, whereas the decision to stay in the job is governed by:
EaVa ¡ EaV
¤
a
> 0. Neither of these two conditions implies the other, but the
posterior choice of job and the ex ante choice of staying correlate (Freeman 1978;
Akerlof, Rose and Yellen 1988). One can be more accurate and derive from (8) the
two following implications: (i) those individuals who su®ered a null or negative
discrepancy in their past career's value (i.e.,
aP
t=1
yt¡y
¤
t
(1+r)
t¡1 · 0) and now report job
satisfaction intend to stay; (ii) those who enjoyed a positive discrepancy in their
past career's value and now report job dissatisfaction intend to quit, unionize, or
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do whatever is best in order to improve their future career. The foregoing analysis
demonstrates that job satisfaction cannot be a consequence, but is rather a cause,
of job turnover and union a±liation. Hence the common practice of including
tenure and union a±liation among the explanatory variables of job satisfaction
(e.g., Borjas 1979, Freeman 1978; Clark and Oswald 1996) is not warranted under
this new interpretation.
4. The data and earnings functions
In a survey conducted by Statistics Canada in 1986, several thousand individuals
across Canada answered the following question : What is your level of satisfaction
(with categorical answers) with your job or principal activity? The survey also
contains information about the respondent's wage over the last twelve months,
age, gender, level of education, years of experience, number of weeks (part time or
full time) employed over the last 12 months, socioeconomic work status, linguistic
ability, region of residence, country of birth, marital status, religion status, and
the level of satisfaction concerning the respondent's health, leisure and marital
situation. These variables, described in Table 1, account for factors a®ecting the
level of satisfaction and/or the determinants of earnings. The sample of 2,600
observations consists of individuals who all declared nonzero wages for the period
considered and were not self-employed.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
In order to estimate past earnings, reservation earnings and earnings
discrepancies, we ran separate earnings regressions for the following age-groups
: 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45 and over. Our initial justi¯cation for partitioning the
sample is that we can test the crucial prediction that the coe±cient of current
earnings (discrepancies) should be inversely U -shaped with age. An additional
motivation will appear in subsection 5.2. Another point of departure from
previous studies (e.g., Hamermesh 1977, Clark and Oswald, 1996) is that we do
not use the log earnings speci¯cation popularized by Mincer (1974). We choose
to regress earnings directly (see (12)) because the causative latent variable is
human wealth (human wealth discrepancy), which is additive in earnings (earnings
discrepancies). If we had estimated the Mincerian equation log y = logy¤+ v, the
generated earnings discrepancy would have been : " ´ y ¡ y¤ = y (1¡ e¡ v).
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Since the latter is proportional to earnings, we would have introduced a spurious
correlation of y¤and ". This might be partly responsible for the weak in°uence
of reference earnings on job satisfaction found in previous studies, holding the
discrepancy term constant.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present for each group the OLS estimates
with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Column (2) introduces a smaller
number of explanatory variables than column (1), for reasons that will become
apparent in subsection 5.2. Many variables are statistically signi¯cant with their
expected signs. In particular, we noted that men are better paid than women
across all age-groups, and that the level of education is an important determinant
of wage. The experience variables are important in the 25-34 age-group, but
the worker's socioeconomic work status and his part time work status a®ect all
age-groups. For the 35-44, the worker's region of residence and religion status
also played a signi¯cant role.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
5. Econometric speci¯cations and problems
5.1. Job satisfaction as felt utility
In principle, equation (6) can be estimated with either one of the three main
de¯nitions of reference earnings that we mentioned in subsection 2.2. However,
we argue that both reservation earnings and expected earnings can be hardly
distinguished empirically from comparison earnings. It should ¯rst be clear that
the earnings predicted for a given individual from a random sample in cross-section
serve as a good econometric estimate for his comparison earnings. The same
¯gure should also come close to that individual's reservation earnings because the
variety of earnings which can be observed from the sample simulate the market
opportunities that would be revealed by his search for the best o®er. Finally, as
far as an econometrician who cannot rely on panel data will be happy enough to
estimate the expected wage from cross-section, it will make a decent econometric
guess for the individual's expected earnings. Therefore, all three de¯nitions of
reference earnings are close to the age-speci¯c earnings predicted by a statistical
earnings function. The earnings discrepancy is then simply the estimated residual
of an earnings function. Note for instance that Hamermesh (1977) and Clark and
Oswald (1996) have both adopted the same \statistical" method while using a
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di®erent concept of reference earnings. Keeping this in mind, we shall be able
to test nine utility models against the null, which we simply call the \statistical"
model. Moreover, these models are partially nested and this will permit selecting
the best one, i.e. the most parsimonious non rejected model. All of the felt utility
models of job satisfaction which will be tested are summarized in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
Although Table 3 and Figure 1 describe the same reality, they have quite
di®erent expositional virtues. Figure 1 helps us to distinguish SWB models at
¯rst glance. On the other hand, Table 3 is a convenient frame for visualizing
which model is nested in which.
5.2. The construction of lifetime earnings and reference earnings from
cross-section data
A full test of the lifetime utility and posterior choice models requires knowledge
of past earnings and reservation earnings. A static version of these would
be empirically undistinguishable from the economic and relative utility models
mentioned in Table 3. Although panel data could solve this problem, we present
here a shortcut method which permits the construction of lifetime earnings from
cross-section data. Most surveys being of the latter type, we believe it is important
for the progress of future research to suggest a cheap and operational way of
beating the static benchmark.
Ex ante job decisions are taken under uncertainty and surprises must inevitably
occur with the passage of time. Our empirical strategy for the construction of
past reservation earnings is to reconstitute individual surprises econometrically.
We acknowledge the fact that earnings surprises originate in the release of new
information about the productivity of self and others and that one part of
it correlates with life-cycle variables whose exact value is unknown in youth
but gets determined sequentially. We divided the past and present in three
periods for reasons mentioned below. Each period is characterized by a di®erent
stock of information, the amount of available information increasing over time.
Periods might be of unequal length both within and between age-groups. The
¯rst period is simply around school-leaving age. For most individuals, relevant
information is then restricted to education level, gender and nationality. Rational
career expectations should be based on just that, and the predictable returns
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to experience. Period 1 reservation earnings have been estimated from that
information only and the coe±cients of the corresponding earnings functions
appear in column 2 of Table 2. While information is minimal at school-leaving age,
it is maximal currently, and a natural de¯nition of currently available information
is given by the complete list of variables which enter the age-speci¯c earnings
functions reported in Table 2.6
Current reservation earnings have been calculated by imputing to each
individual observed values of the latter variables and taking the coe±cients found
in column 1. Since information is acquired sequentially, this methodology can
also be used to estimate the reservation earnings of an intermediate period in
which the worker has a good idea of the factors which a®ect earnings but draws
his comparison from a heterogeneous sample. Consequently, period 2 reservation
earnings have been simulated by taking the coe±cients of column 1 and attributing
to each worker the age-speci¯c average value of the variables, listed in column 1,
which remain unknown by the workers at that time.7
Having thus computed the three period reservation earnings
³
y^1; y^2; y^3
´
for
every individual (denoting the school-leaving period by 1 and the current period
by 3), we now turn on to the estimation of own earnings in the same periods
(y1, y2, y3). The end-period earnings, y3; are currently observed in the sample.
As for the remaining two past periods, we consistently de¯ne :
y2 = y^3 ; y1 = y^2, (9)
from the assumption that the updating of an individual's opportunities with
experience follows his discovery of ever more complete information about his
6The statistical variables which are meant to capture the release of new information through
the life-cycle appear in column 1. They include measures of the time allocated to work
(JOBWKS, WPART, LTDS), place of residence (ONT), marital status (MARRD, DIVOR),
health (HEDS), religion status (NOREL), and socio-economic status (WSSP, WSTF). We
are conscious that it is not common practice in the human capital literature to include
socio-economic status in the earnings function since it is, at least in part, a choice variable.
But the aim pursued here is not to obtain consistent estimates of the returns to education and
experience. It is rather to get a close econometric simulation of an individual's reference earnings
by taking the mean earnings of a sample of \similar" persons. Presumably, age and broadly
de¯ned elements of socio-economic attainment are basic indicators of similarity with respect to
job.
7This concerns all the variables except gender, education level, nationality and experience
(and the square).
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personal situation. Another way of justifying (9) is to say that an individual's
reference earnings in any period but the ¯rst one should be his own earnings one
period back.
Cross-sectional estimates for past (reservation) earnings should be corrected
for the spurious e®ect of experience between the period in the past and the period
of the survey. Taking age-group-speci¯c earnings and job satisfaction functions
allows us to control for much of this e®ect by addition of a constant term. The
further introduction of experience (EXPER) among the explanatory variables of
the job satisfaction equation produced no signi¯cant result and was eventually
abandoned. This brings another motivation for splitting the sample by age-group.
Finally, we consider four successive periods in the past for the lifetime utility
model by application of equation (9) one period back :
Ji = ® + Zi¯ + '1y^1;i + '2y^2;i + '3y^3;i + '4y3;i + &i; (10)
The posterior choice model is speci¯ed with just the three periods in the past
:
Ji = ® + Zi¯ + Ã1"^1i + Ã2"^2i + Ã3"^3i + &i, (11)
with "^3i = y3i ¡ y^3i ; "^2i = y^3i ¡ y^2i ; "^1i = y^2i ¡ y^1i.
If job satisfaction is partly backward-looking, it is expected that the coe±cients
of earnings in (10) and the coe±cients of earnings discrepancies in (11) decrease
over time :
'1 > '2 > '3 > '4 ;
Ã1 > Ã2 > Ã3.
In both equations (10) and (11), the error term &i captures the forward-looking
part of human wealth (discrepancy), unobserved variables and measurement
errors. Since the present value of future lifetime earnings declines with experience,
the variance of the error term in equations (10) and (6) must also decline
with experience if reported job satisfaction is to be interpreted as felt utility.
Consequently, all our regressions will be corrected for heteroskedasticity. The
foregoing analysis must be adapted to the posterior choice model described by
equation (11). As a matter of fact, the present value of future lifetime earnings
discrepancies would only decline with experience if the latter were positively
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correlated, and we know that this will frequently, but not necessarily, happen.
So, heteroskedasticity may once more be a problem.
5.3. The problem of using generated regressors
Past earnings and earnings discrepancies, which enter as explanatory variables
in the job satisfaction equations, are estimates drawn from age-group-speci¯c
earnings functions. For instance, the earnings discrepancy "i is obtained as the
residual of :
yi = Wi¸+ "i; (12)
in which it is assumed that W 0
i
is a set of exogenous variables independent of "i.
Ideally, we want to estimate jointly the determinants of job satisfaction and
(reference) earnings. The presence, however, of a discrete variable in the job
satisfaction equation and, the additional di±culty of dealing with unobserved
past earnings for the posterior choice and lifetime utility models convert a
simple computational problem into a rather complex one. An alternative is to
consider two-stage estimators. Unfortunately, as shown by Pagan (1984, 1986),
McAleer and McKenzie (1991) among others, generally in the context of linear
models, these two-stage and related estimators could have severe limitations
including e±ciency losses. In some cases, inconsistency could result for nonlinear
models. All models considered here are vulnerable on that last account, but
one can expect to improve consistency by assuming that E (&i"i) = 0 (also
an identifying restriction for some models). This weak exogeneity assumption8
presumes that the unobserved determinants of earnings should be uncorrelated
with the unobserved determinants of job satisfaction. Such assumption should be
veri¯ed by discrepancy models inasmuch unobserved determinants of earnings, like
ability, have an equal e®ect on reference earnings and thus do not a®ect the future
earnings discrepancies which form the major component of Si. On the other hand,
it is more problematic if the true model is the economic model (in either static,
or lifetime version), the relative utility, or the social comparison model (in either
weak or strong form). Moreover, the above assumption might be invalidated by
the presence of job speci¯c investments and e±ciency wage incentives.
Parametric two-step estimators substitute for the latent regressors in (6), (10)
8See Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) for a discussion of weak exogeneity.
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and (11), their least square estimates y^
³
= W (W 0W )
¡1
W 0y = PWy
´
and "^ =
(y ¡ y^) from the earnings equation (12).
Speci¯cally, for the posterior choice model (11), we obtain after some
manipulations :
Ji = ® + Zi¯ + Ã1(y^2;i ¡ y^1;i) + Ã2(y^3;i ¡ y^2;i) + Ã3(y3;i ¡ y^3;i) + ¹i;
with the composite error ¹i :
¹i = &i + Ã1
³
v1 ¡ r1 + Pw1;i"1;i
´
+ Ã2
³
v2 ¡ r2 + Pw2;i"2;i
´
+ Ã3Pw3;i"3;i: (13)
The v and r are additional error terms due to our estimates of the observed
and reservation earnings in periods 2 and 1 based on current data (period
3). Under the null, H0 : Ãj = 0 for all j
0s, the two-step procedure yields
consistent and e±cient estimates. For Ãj 6= 0, the error term is non-spherical
causing not only an e±ciency problem, but some parameter estimates might be
inconsistent in the context of a discrete dependent variable. Some corrections for
the heteroskedasticity problem will be proposed, and likelihood ratio tests will be
used for statistical inferences.
Comparable speci¯cations can be derived for the lifetime utility, and static
SWB models by substituting y^ for y¤ and "^ for " into equation (10) and (6). In
the previous empirical literature on job satisfaction, this problem of generated
regressors has been completely ignored.
6. Empirical results on job satisfaction
Our estimation of equations (6), (10) and (11) rests on an ordered probit model9
to account for the categorical nature of the dependent variable.10 Let Ji be the
9The ordered probit model is presented in Maddala (1983) and was ¯rst estimated by
McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). Greene (1995, 480) discusses the technical details of integrating
the heterosckedasticity in the basic model.
10The discreteness of the statistical measure of reported job satisfaction conforms well with the
conventional and unconventional (eg. Hamermesh 1977, Clark 1993) theories of ordinal utility.
Defendors of a cardinalist conception must face the problem of converting an ordinal statement
onto a cardinal scale. They solve it by asking respondents to evaluate their feelings on a detailed
Likert-type scale (for instance, Michalos (1985) uses a 7-point scale: terrible=1,..., delightful=7).
Psychologists usually treat the stated rank as a continuous variable. Van de Stadt at alii (1985)
use the more sophisticated information maximization argument of Van Praag (1968).
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observed, ordinal satisfaction variable that has three possible outcomes. Ji is
related to the latent variable Ui by a set of constants or thresholds such that :
Ji = 0 if Ui · ±0;
= 1 if ±0 < Ui · ±1;
= 2 if ±1 < Ui:
(14)
This model implies that the probability of obtaining an observation with Ji = 1
is :
Prob (Ji = 1) = F ((±1 ¡X
0
i
Á)=wi) ¡ F ((±0 ¡X
0
i
Á)=wi) ;
where F is the cumulative normal distribution function and `wi' is the individual
speci¯c standard deviation. The latter is either 1 for all i (homoskedasticity),
or, to account for heteroskedasticity, wi which adds no new parameter, or e
¼
0
wi
for multiplicative heteroskedasticity adding an additional parameter vector ¼
0
.
Similar expressions can be found for the other observed Ji values. When an
intercept, ®; is included in the equation for Ui, identi¯cation is achieved by setting
±0 = 0.
The three categories for the dependent variable job satisfaction, JOBS, range
from the lowest to the highest level of satisfaction : \totally and rather displeased",
\rather satis¯ed" and \fully satis¯ed". The percentages of observations in each
category for the overall sample of 2600 observations are respectively : 9.38%,
43.12%, 47.50%. High levels of job satisfaction are not unusual in these surveys
[see Krahn and Lowe (1988)] and is predicted by the posterior choice model.
In Table 4, we present the level of satisfaction by age-groups. It can be seen
that the proportion of fully satis¯ed individuals increases with age as predicted
by the same model.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Analyzing the frequency data between the level of satisfaction and the level of
education, we reject the independence of the two variables for the 15-24 (p-value
= 0.036) and the 35-44 (p-value = 0.068) age-groups. Here the level of satisfaction
appears to increase with the level of education, a result coherent with the lifetime
utility model. In the posterior choice framework, such dependence might be due to
job rationing which would thus decrease with education level in these age groups.
The independence between the level of satisfaction and gender of the respondent
is never rejected as predicted by the posterior choice model. These two results
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are at variance with the recent ¯ndings of Clark and Oswald (1996) and Clark
(1993) on British data, which seems to imply that job tastes do not systematically
di®er by education and gender. The lack of robustness of these e®ects leaves
little substance to ad hoc determinations of job satisfaction in comparison with
discrepancy factors.
6.1. Test of SWB models:
We obtained ordered probit estimates for all the felt utility models. The results
respect the speci¯city of each model (in terms of constrained coe±cients)11 and the
ordered probits were corrected for multiplicative heteroskedasticity with the years
of experience variable, EXPER12. The ¯rst important ¯nding is that, with only
one exception, the statistical model, or null hypothesis, cannot be rejected in the
young (15-24) and older (45+) age groups. This cannot be accommodated under
a static interpretation of utility, but corroborates the (partly) backward looking
nature of satisfaction and the presence of training and other deferred payment
schemes in early career. For space reasons, we do not report these results which
are available on request.
Moreover, the only exception for which the likelihood ratio test rejects the
statistical model in favor of the loss aversion model (p-value = 0.012) concerns
the 15-24 age-group. For that case, the coe±cients °2; °3; °4; °5 are all signi¯cant
but with the wrong sign, except for °3:
Results for the 25-34 and 35-44 age-groups, reported in Tables 5a and 5b
respectively, are less negative.
[Insert Table 5A about here.]
In the 25-34 age group, likelihood ratio tests indicate that all felt utility
models are preferred to the restricted log likelihood associated with the null with
p-values less than 1%. However, all economic and SWB models are not equally
11For example, for the loss aversion model, the proportional factor ¯xing the range of each
dummy variable is set to _µ = 1:5 for the negative earnings discrepancies while Á = 1. On the
other models µ = Á = 1. These values yield a su±cient number of observations for all categories.
Di®erent values were tried without modifying the results.
12EXPER is a variable used in the ¯rst stage of the estimation procedure and has a relatively
large variance. Di®erent variables and a combination of variables were also tried without
improving the correction given by EXPER.
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good. A simple t-test rejects the assumption that °1 = °2 and accepts °1 < °2,
but a likelihood ratio test rejects any di®erence between the two models13. In
turn, the unrestricted log likelihoods of the social comparison (weak form), the
cognitive dissonance II, the disappointment-elation and the loss aversion models
are statistically no di®erent from the restricted log likelihood of the parsimonious
relative utility model. The loop is closed to favor the relative utility model when
we note that the disappointment-elation model is preferred to the restricted social
comparison (strong form) model (p-value = 0.0064), and the cognitive dissonance
II model is preferred to the restricted cognitive dissonance I model (p-value=
0.00075). In the relative utility model,14 a positive (negative) discrepancy will
positively (negatively) in°uence the utility.
[Insert Table 5B about here.]
In the 35-44 age-group, only the economic model, the relative utility model
and the social comparison model (weak form) are preferred to the null. These
results are obtained from likelihood ratio tests with p-values less than or equal
to 5%. Again, the unrestricted log likelihood of social comparison (weak form)
model is statistically no di®erent from the restricted log likelihood of the economic
and the relative utility model. The relative utility model remains the preferred
model.
It is also possible to evaluate each SWB utility function for its own sake.
Even if we restrict attention to the results reported in tables 5A and 5B for
the intermediate age groups, the nonlinearities implied by cognitive dissonance II
(°5 > 0), disappointment/elation (°3 > 0), and loss aversion (°2 > 0) are strongly
rejected by a Student test and the coe±cients are insigni¯cant with the wrong sign,
most of the time. Such refutations do not occur for the other models, although
some coe±cients may be insigni¯cant.
To summarize, all of the static utility models are rejected against the null
(which simply relates job satisfaction to statistical determinants of taste like
gender and education) in the younger and in the older age groups. In the two
13The loglikelihoods of the economic model are reported in ** of Tables 5A and
5B.
14The relative utility model is empirically undistinguishable from the di®erential satisfaction
hypothesis of Hamermesh (1977), and from the surprise model of Cohen and Axelrod (1984)
although earlier discussion has shown that the use of generated regressors may raise less problems
if one of the latter models is the true one.
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intermediate age-groups, a simple discrepancy model fares better than the null and
cannot be rejected against any other SWB hypothesis. However, the conventional
economic model relating job satisfaction to earnings cannot be ruled out, at this
stage, in the 35-44 age-group.
It was mentioned earlier that the use of generated regressors cannot throw
doubt on the test when the theory is to be rejected. Therefore, social comparison
(in weak and strong form), cognitive dissonance (I and II), disappointment-elation,
and loss aversion do not appear to be promising tracks for understanding job
satisfaction in view of the complication added by these theories. Of course,
some of these theories are perhaps better suited to the analysis of choices under
risk and other domains of behavior for which they were primitively designed.
Disappointment-elation is a case at hand. Our claim is simply that none of the
more complicated utility functions involving discrepancy terms that have been
suggested in the literature is a better predictor of job satisfaction than a linear
function of earnings discrepancy. Nor is the conventional economic model.
6.2. Test of the posterior choice model:
Table 6 presents the results of the posterior choice model for all age-groups. We
¯rst note, once more, that it does not perform better than the statistical model
in the 15-24 and 45+ age-groups, but this is now consistent with the lifetime
interpretation (see the discussion in 2.1). Also predicted by this model, the
coe±cient of the current earnings discrepancy b"3 is inversely U - shaped and
the peak is attained by the 25-34 age-group. The same observations could
have been made from tables 5A and 5B about relative utility models, but were
not predicted by the latter. In order to make a crucial empirical distinction
between both interpretations, it is necessary to look at the coe±cients of past
earnings discrepancies, "^1 and "^2. The fact that they appear with the correct
sign, are also signi¯cant in the intermediate age groups (at the 5% level in
the 25-34 age group and at the 10% level in the 35-44 age group), and follow
the inverse U -shaped pattern across age-groups, is highly supportive of our new
interpretation. An even more decisive argument is supplied by the log likelihood
test: in the middle age-groups, the unrestricted loglikelihood of the posterior
choice model is statistically signi¯cantly greater (p values=0.0069 and 0.0219 in
the 25-34 and 35-44 age-groups respectively) than the restricted log likelihood of
the relative utility model. It seems to be the ¯rst time that a new model has
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been able to beat the benchmark of simple discrepancy theories! Furthermore,
this result has been obtained in spite of the presumably great imprecision of the
cross-section estimates for past earnings discrepancies, which drives the related
coe±cients towards zero.
The ranking of the three coe±cients of past and current earnings discrepancies
provides new strong evidence in favor of the posterior choice model. In conformity
with theoretical predictions, it is found that a discrepancy's e®ect on reported job
satisfaction is the greater the more distant it was experienced in the past. This
pattern is exactly observed in three age-groups, and the coe±cients of "^1 and "^3
are truly apart. The only violation concerns an age group (15-24) for which the
prediction was not reliable for two reasons: the incidence of human investments
and other deferred payment schemes in early career, and the \thinness of past"
for recent school-leavers. As it is, the set of results should be quite convincing
because it runs counter the loose intuition that more remote events should be
discounted.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
One interesting feature of the posterior choice model is the theoretical
possibility of retrieving, from the coe±cients of the time varying earnings
discrepancy variables, the rate of interest (or time preference) for the average
individual in our sample. Unfortunately, the periods that correspond to the three
estimated discrepancies are not de¯ned with any precision, so that any calculation
is highly speculative without panel data. The main impression that emerges from
the data, at this stage, is that the average discount rate is substantially greater
in the early career than later on.
All the estimations, for both the felt utility models and the posterior choice
model, were done correcting for multiplicative heteroskedasticity of the second
stage estimation with the experience variable, EXPER. The coe±cient estimates
of this variable are always negative and statistically signi¯cant for some regressions
(see Table 5B and 6). The negative value suggests that the residual variance in
the level of reported job satisfaction decreases with the labor market experience
of the individuals. This result is consistent with the fact that the forward looking
part of human wealth discrepancy (see equation (8)) is essentially in the residual
and decreases with experience on average as the span of the remaining working
life decreases.
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6.3. Test of the lifetime utility model:
We conclude this empirical section by showing the ordered probit estimates of
equation (10) in table 7. This provides an extended test of the conventional
economic model by substituting lifetime past earnings for current earnings. If the
lifetime utility model were true, all coe±cients of earnings should take positive
and decreasing values from the past to the present. Our results plainly contradict
these predictions: the coe±cient of y^1 is always negative (signi¯cant at the 10%
level in the 35-44 age group), and the coe±cients of y^2, y^3, y3 exhibit a U -shaped
pattern. Hence, there is no way to rescue the conventional economic model by
adding some dynamics.
It is possible to rewrite the deterministic part of equation (11), i.e. the
posterior choice model, into equation (10) since the earnings discrepancies are
simple combinations of y^1, y^2, y^3, and y3. One gets:
Ã1 (y^2 ¡ y^1) + Ã2 (y^3 ¡ y^2) + Ã3 (y3 ¡ y^3)
= ¡Ã1 y^1 + (Ã1 ¡ Ã2) y^2 + (Ã2 ¡ Ã3) y^3 + Ã3 y3 ;
which must be juxtaposed to: '1 y^1 + '2 y^2 + '3 y^3 + '4 y3 :
The pattern of coe±cients observed in table 7 emerges from the theoretical
prediction that Ã1 > Ã2 > Ã3 > 0. Thus we should have '1 < 0; '2 > '3 > 0; and
'4 > 0. Moreover, we check that '4 = Ã3 by comparing the related coe±cients
from tables 6 and 7. Other comparisons, and especially '1 = ¡Ã1, are obviously
more fuzzy but of the same order of magnitude.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
In summary, the lifetime utility model is unambiguously rejected in favor of
the posterior choice model.15
7. Concluding remarks
A new theory should be preferred to the conventional wisdom when it predicts
more facts, rests on fewer ad hoc assumptions, and when the prior model is
15We may add a little spice to this conclusion by noticing that both models fare equally well
in terms of loglikelihood (which is no surprise).
23
consistently rejected by the data against the new one. On all these accounts,
considerable evidence found in this paper indicates that, when someone reports
his satisfaction with something that he has experienced, he does not really
communicate the number of utils that he felt, but rather states his own preference
for that thing over his best alternative conditional on what he knows and expects
of both, at this time.
In simple words, reporting one's satisfaction is the judgment that one would
now repeat one's past experience if one had to choose again. Under certainty
and stable preferences, one would always be satis¯ed with an unconstrained and
deliberate decision made in the past. It is merely the occurrence of surprises and
constraint changes which makes the posterior preference deviate from the prior.
This new interpretation does not invalidate the empirical ¯ndings of
psychological and sociological research on the subject, which emphasized the
role of discrepancies between objective conditions and a reference on reported
satisfaction. It is exactly what the new theory predicts. However, this
important result does not require utility to be relative and comparable across
persons, because choice and preference are obviously relative and ordinal concepts.
Furthermore, the new theory characterizes the reference from which discrepancies
are appreciated as the individual's best alternative at the time he makes a
satisfaction judgment. This comes closest to the pioneering analysis of Hamermesh
(1977), but we believe Festinger (1954) had essentially the same reference in mind
in his illuminating theory of social comparison processes.16
Recognition of the intertemporal dimension of satisfaction judgments
signi¯cantly improves the empirical content of the theory and illuminates several
hidden aspects of human behavior. For instance, older persons appear less
sensitive to current discrepancies, and discrepancies experienced in the remote
past have far greater weight on job satisfaction judgments than what happens at
16Festinger (1954) clearly states (p.121): \Corollary III A: Given a range of possible persons
for comparison, someone close to one's own ability or opinion will be chosen for comparison;"
and (p. 120): \Corollary II B: When an objective, non-social basis for the evaluation of one's
ability or opinion is readily available persons will not evaluate their opinions or abilities by
comparison with others".
These two corollaries put together indicate that, in Festinger's mind, comparison would be a
proxy for such information when the latter was not available or too costly; and thus comparison
with most similar persons would be a way of evaluating one's best alternative. Festinger
suggested an information-based argument for social comparison, not a theory of interdependent
preferences.
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present. These two predictions are reminiscent of the fact that wisdom comes
with age and that traumas su®ered during childhood have quite persistent e®ects
on human satisfaction. The observation that current earnings discrepancies have
a negligible, and perhaps negative, e®ect on the job satisfaction of young workers
is another striking testimony that individuals have a long planning horizon and
consciously make on-the-job investments. Such a result is remarkable because
studies using training data have after been unable to ¯nd consistent evidence of
workers paying for their training through lower starting wages. The test of a
life-cycle model on cross-sectional data may attract some suspicion on our results
and the study needs to be replicated on longitudinal data. On the other hand,
that limitation forced us to design an easily replicable methodology for partially
recovering past earnings discrepancies from cross section.
Straightening up the interpretation of satisfaction judgments restores the
power of microeconomic theory and should thus make economists feel less
reluctant to exploit the wealth of such qualitative data in econometric studies
of job mobility, job matching, union membership, ¯rms' compensation policies,
and many other sorts of human behavior.
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TABLE 4
Reported Job Satisfaction Level by Age Groups1
Satisfaction Levels
Age Groups
15-24 25-34 35-44 45+
Totally and rather displeased 54 106 47 37
13.04 % 10.19 % 7.01 % 7.77 %
Rather satisfied 197 469 279 176
47.58 % 45.10 % 41.64 % 36.97 %
Fully satisfied 163 465 344 263
39.37 % 44.71 % 51.34 % 55.25 %
Total 414 1 040 670 476
Note :   Number of individuals and percentages, respectively.1
TABLE 1
Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Symbols Definitions Means
(Standard Errors)
JOBS Level of job satisfaction :
- totally and rather displeased 0.0938
- rather satisfied 0.4312
- fully satisfied 0.4750
WAGE Wage income for the last 12 months (in $000) 22.41
(12.7)
SEXM Gender of the respondent :
  male = 1; female = 0 0.5408
ED08 Education :
  8 years or less = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0658
ED13- Education :
  9-13 years = 1; 0 otherwise 0.4796
ED13+ Education :
  13+ years without university degree = 1; 0 otherwise 0.3034
EDUN Education :
  university = 1; 0 otherwise 0.1512
EXPER Years of experience 13.8488
(11.55)
JOBWKS Number of weeks employed over the last 12 months 47.79
(10.14)
WPART Over these weeks :
  working mostly part time = 1; 0 otherwise 0.1031
WSSP Socioeconomic work status :
  professional, high level management = 1; 0 otherwise 0.1327
WSTF Work status :
  specialized, technician, supervisor = 1; 0 otherwise 0.4558
WSNS Work status :
  semi and unskilled = 1; 0 otherwise 0.4035
WFFL Work status :
  farmer and farm laborers = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0080
LANF Mother tongue :
  French = 1; 0 otherwise 0.2461
LANE Mother tongue :
  English = 1; 0 otherwise 0.7188
LANB Linguistic ability :
  bilingual in French and English = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0138
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Symbols Definitions Means
(Standard Errors)
ONTR Region of residence :
  Ontario = 1; 0 otherwise 0.2223
CAND Country of birth :
  Canada = 1; 0 otherwise 0.8785
MARRD Marital status :
  married = 1; 0 otherwise 0.6323
DIVOR Marital status :
  divorced = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0842
NOREL Religious status :
  no religion = 1; 0 otherwise 0.1127
HEDS Health satisfaction :
  rather or totally displeased = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0673
LTDS Leisure time satisfaction :
  rather or totally displeased = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0769
MSDS Marital status satisfaction :
  rather or totally displeased = 1; 0 otherwise 0.0581
Source : The 1986 General Social Survey-Cycle 2, Statistics Canada.
TABLE 2
Age-Specific Earnings Functions
Explanatory
Variablesa
Age Groups
15-24 25-34 35-44 45+
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -3.936 6.024 -4.610 10.14 -11.93 9.719 -4.164 13.60
(2.44) (2.78) (2.15) (2.18) (3.02) (2.63) (3.46) (3.96)
a a a a a a
SEXM 3.800 3.103 7.581 8.844 8.249 10.74 10.19 12.95a
(0.623) (0.669) (0.561) (0.604) (0.829) (0.905) (0.870) (1.03)
a a a a a a a
ED13- -0.222 -0.679 -1.214 -1.531 1.036 2.045 0.400 0.939
(1.69) (1.99) (1.24) (1.39) (1.25) (1.44) (1.07) (1.23)
ED13+ 2.970 4.068 0.800 1.940 3.895 5.262 2.418 4.604
(1.78) (2.07) (1.35) (1.49) (1.40) (1.59) (1.55) (1.68)
a a a a
EDUN 6.478 8.202 5.253 7.265 9.284 14.29 7.800 14.73a
(2.01) (2.32) (1.63) (1.63) (1.79) 1.87) (2.18) (2.18)
a a a a a a a
EXPER 0.829 2.512 1.436 1.919 0.427 0.617 0.185 0.309b
(0.442) (0.484) (0.221) (0.251) (0.224) (0.265) (0.191) (0.263)
a a a b a
EXPER2 0.0159 -0.157 -0.072 -0.0946 -0.0100 -0.0175 -0.0051 -0.0084
(0.074) (0.083) (0.012) (0.0138) (0.0075) (0.0088) (0.0035) (0.0049)
b a a a b
CAND 0.283 0.457 -1.236 -1.097 1.676 1.354 1.440 -0.332
(1.21) (1.46) (1.11) (1.22) (1.09) (1.24) (1.09) (1.27)
JOBWKS 0.234 0.347 0.409 0.337a
(0.021) (0.026) (0.039) (0.047)
a a a
WPART -2.653 -5.358 -7.506 -8.281a
(0.723) (1.01) (1.34) (1.51)
a a a
WSSP 3.980 2.820 8.879 10.79a
(1.03) (1.05) (1.29) (2.23)
a a a
WSTF 2.608 2.374 4.810 4.295a
(0.682) (0.608) (0.892) (0.904)
a a a
LANB -1.848 2.252 2.588 -2.030
(2.24) (2.44) (3.21) (2.45)
ONT 0.759 -1.004 3.363 2.326
(0.710) (0.651) (1.05) (1.10)
a a
MARRD 2.600 0.379 1.342 0.753a
(0.664) (0.616) (1.11) (1.45)
DIVOR 3.749 1.067 0.909 -0.440b
(2.16) (1.24) (1.45) (1.51)
NOREL 0.425 0.920 3.197 2.554
(0.782) (0.903) (1.53) (1.42)
a b
HEDS -0.670 0.208 0.568 -1.472
(1.17) (1.08) (1.69) (1.36)
LTDS -2.023 0.854 -0.289 -1.348a
(0.791) (1.02) (1.72) (1.54)
R 0.420 0.234 0.382 0.242 0.468 0.287 0.509 0.338
&
2
N observations 414 414 1 040 1 040 670 670 476 476
Notes : ( ) Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
  Coefficients significant at the 5 % (2.5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.a
  Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.b
    The ED08, WSNS and WFFL variables are excluded.
TABLE 5A
Ordered Probit Estimates (Standard Errors) for the Utility and Other Subjective
Well-Being Models for the 25-34 Age Group 
Models**
Coefficients
y 0 D0 D 0 D 0 Z* Loglkh.^ ^ ^
+
^
-
^
Relative utility 0.01841 7 , 9 , 10 , -961.7575b
(0.0044) 11
+  -  -
-
Social comparison (weak 0.01140 0.01839 1 , 7 , 9 , -960.5135
form) (0.0071) (0.0044) 10 , 11 ,
a -  +  -
-  -
Social comparison 0.01150 0.02839 0.2839 7 , 9 , 10 , -964.2231
(strong form) (0.0070) (0.0084) (0.0084) 11
b a a +  -  -
-
Cognitive dissonance I 0.01148 0.2340 7 , 9 , 10 , -966.2201b
(0.0070) (0.0083) 11
a +  -  -
-
Cognitive dissonance II 0.1143 0.02135 -0.02135 -0.00431 1 , 7 , 9 , -960.5473
(0.0071) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0117) 10 , 11
a a -  +  -
-  -
Disappointment/elation 0.01140 0.01854 -0.00037 -0.00037 1 , 7 , 9 , -960.5131
(0.0071) (0.0071) (0.013) (0.013) 10 , 11
a -  +  -
-  -
Loss aversion -0.00584 0.03984 0.00584 0.00584 4 , 7 , 9 , -965.9755
(0.0192) (0.0256) (0.0192) (0.0192) 10 , 11
+  +  -
-  -
Notes :   Coefficients significant at the 5 % (2.5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.a
  Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.b
* Z = 1 : SEXM, 2 : ED13-, 3 : ED13+, 4 : EDUN, 5 : LANF, 6 : LANE, 7 : CAND, 8 : NOREL, 9 : HEDS, 10 : LTDS,
11 : MSDS.  The number indicates the corresponding variable in Z when positively (+) or negatively (-) significant at the
5 % level.  The loglikelihood for the Z* reference model (the statistical model) is -971.3756.
** The loglikelihood for the economic model is -960.8649.
The constant " and the threshold parameter *  are significant in all models.  The coefficients of the variable EXPER to
1
account for the heteroskedasticity are negative but insignificant in all models.
TABLE 5B
Ordered Probit Estimates (Standard Errors) for the Utility and Other Subjective
Well-Being Models for the 35-44 Age Group
Models**
Coefficients
y 0 D0 D 0 D 0 Z* Loglkh.^ ^ ^
+
^
-
^
Relative utility 0.00755 9 , 10 -578.3899a
(0.00387)
-  -
Social comparison (weak 0.00874 0.00827 1 , 9 , 10 -577.2672
form) (0.0058) (0.0041)
a -  -  -
Social comparison 0.00913 0.01257 0.01257 9 , 10 -578.1774
(strong form) (0.0059) (0.0073) (0.0073)
b b -  -
Cognitive dissonance I 0.00869 0.00759 9 , 10 -579.6303
(0.0059) (0.0074)
-  -
Cognitive dissonance II 0.00838 0.01032 -0.01032 -0.00572 1 , 9 , 10 -577.6880
(0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0114)
b b -  -  -
Disappointment/elation 0.00875 0.00818 0.00021 0.00021 1 , 9 , 10 -577.2670
(0.0059) (0.0065) (0.0119) (0.0119)
-  -  -
Loss aversion -0.00290 0.02076 0.00290 0.00290 9 , 10 -578.7712
(0.0162) (0.0217) (0.0162) (0.0162)
-  -
Notes :   Coefficients significant at the 5 % (2.5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.a
  Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate..b
* Z = 1 : SEXM, 2 : ED13-, 3 : ED13+, 4 : EDUN, 5 : LANF, 6 : LANE, 7 : CAND, 8 : NOREL, 9 : HEDS, 10 : LTDS,
11 : MSDS.  The number indicates the corresponding variable in Z when positively (+) or negatively (-) significant at the
5 % level or 10 % level.  The loglikelihood for the Z* reference model (the statistical model) is -581.0159.
** The loglikelihood for the economic model is -577.2696.
The constant " and the threshold parameter *  are significant in all models.  The coefficients of the variable EXPER to
1
account for the heteroskedasticity are negative and significant in all models.
TABLE 6
Ordered Probit Estimates (Standard Errors) of the
Posterior Choice Model of Job Satisfaction
Explanatory Age Groups
Variables and
Statistics 15-24 25-34 35-44 45+
(y  - y )= g 0.01301 0.1138 0.1883 0.1112^   ^  ^
2  1  1
(0.0397) (0.0551) (0.0986) (0.0731)
a b
(y  - y )= g -0.00718 0.02235 0.01032 0.00701^   ^  ^
3  2  2
(0.0164) (0.0081) (0.00616) (0.0083)
a b
(y  - y )= g 0.01393 0.01795 0.00846 0.00600
3  3  3
^  ^ b
(0.0085) (0.0043) (0.00410) (0.0045)
a a
SEXM 0.01657 0.04269 0.3842 0.3276
(0.109) (0.098) (0.2554) (0.218)
ED13- -0.5126 0.02677 0.3067 0.02545a
(0.249) (0.137) (0.162) (0.109)
b
ED13+ -0.2215 0.1261 0.1730 0.5727
(0.254) (0.151) (0.197) (0.278)
a
EDUN 0.0337 0.3893 1.152 0.8266a
(0.326) (0.171) (0.549) (0.583)
a a
LANF 1.0540 -0.0880 0.3329 0.2272a
(0.405) (0.243) (0.225) (0.224)
LANE 1.0281 -0.1297 0.3067 0.2018a
(0.402) (0.233) (0.215) (0.219)
CAND -0.3207 0.2943 -0.09914 -0.2686
(0.199) (0.135) (0.113) (0.183)
a
NOREL -0.4663 -0.1023 0.1102 -0.3891a
(0.152) (0.104) (0.121) (0.190)
a
HEDS -0.3635 -0.3760 -0.3611 -0.2715
(0.231) (0.139) (0.144) (0.171)
a a
LTDS 0.03275 -0.2597 -0.4365 -0.6534
(0.209) (0.115) (0.139) (0.235)
a a a
MSDS -0.4890 -0.5645 -0.05579 -0.2368a
(0.216) (0.144) (0.169) (0.154)
a
" 0.8481 1.078 0.4571 0.9143a
(0.414) (0.285) (0.351) (0.295)
a a
* 1.332 1.423 1.202 1.056
1
a
(0.134) (0.119) (0.175) (0.257)
a a a
EXPER -0.04385 -0.00371 -0.01416 -0.00894
(0.0284) (0.002) (0.0082) (0.00740)
b
Loglikelihood -385.8752 -956.7874 -574.8731 -401.2447
N observations 414 1 040 670 476
Notes :   Coefficients significant at the 5 % (2.5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.a
  Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.b
TABLE 7
Ordered Probit Estimates (Standard Errors)
of the Lifetime Utility Model of Job Satisfaction
Explanatory Age Group
Variables and
Statistics 15-24 25-34 35-44 45+
y -0.02055 -0.2955 -0.2037 -0.9338^
1
(0.0629) (0.427) (0.107) (1.29)
b
y 0.03474 0.3373 0.2150 1.426^
2
(0.101) (0.576) (0.130) (2.07)
b
y -0.02119 0.004379 0.00203 0.00091^
3
(0.0188) (0.0089) (0.0071) (0.0084)
y 0.01396 0.01782 0.00873 0.00573
3
(0.00867) (0.00427) (0.0043) (0.0043)
a a
Loglikelihood -385.8616 -956.6946 -574.7736 -401.1967
Notes :   Coefficients significant at the 5 % (2.5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.a
  Coefficients significant at the 10 % (5%) level, two tails (one tail) when appropriate.b
The variables that are significant in the Z vector are generally the same as those reported in Table 6.  The threshold
parameter *  is  significant in each age-group. The coefficient of the variable EXPER to account for the heteroskedasticity
1
is negative but insignificant in each age-group.
Table 3
Qualitative Predictions of Various Felt Utility Models
 on Reported Job Satisfaction, and Linear Constraints on the Coefficients
Models ( ( ( ( ( constraints1 2 3 4 5
Statistical (H )            0 0 0 0 0 0
Economic                          + + 0 0 0 ( = (1  2
SWB :
Relative utility 0 + 0 0 0
Social Comparison (weak) + + 0 0 0 ( > (2   1
Social Comparison (strong) $0 0 + 0 + ( = (3  5
Cognitive dissonance I $0 0 0 0 +
Cognitive dissonance II     $0 + ! 0 + ( = !(3  2
Disappointment-elation $0 + + 0 + ( = (3  5
Loss aversion 0 + + ! ! ( = ( =!(4  5 2
